rfc-8917

The LoST-Validation Straightforward-Naming Authority PoinTeR (S-NAPTR) Application Service Tag

R. Gellens, B. Rosen
date2020-10 streamIETF wgnon working group statusPROPOSED STANDARD pages7 canonicalhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8917 doi10.17487/RFC8917
This document adds the 'LoST-Validation' service tag to the Straightforward-Naming Authority PoinTeR (S-NAPTR) Application Service Tag IANA registry. This tag can appear in a Naming Authority Pointer (NAPTR) Domain Name System (DNS) record to assist clients of the Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) Protocol in identifying LoST servers designated for location validation. This tag and the information about its use update RFC 5222, which enables the explicit discovery of a server that supports location validation.

updates

Extracted elements (11)

design-rationale §2

A distinct service tag ('LoST-Validation') is preferred over a DNS naming convention (e.g., 'ecrf.example.org' vs 'lvf.example.org') because DNS name conventions are inflexible and fragile, and because LoST referrals return an AUS rather than a URL, requiring a mechanism that works throughout the full LoST tree structure.

dns

design-rationale §2

The NENA i3 architecture requires the mapping (ECRF) and validation (LVF) functions to be separable because the mapping service is used in real time during emergency call routing with high availability requirements, while validation is used in advance during data provisioning and can tolerate lower availability. A separate tag allows operators to deploy these on independent server clusters.

dns

design-rationale §3

Using a dedicated 'LoST-Validation' tag reduces the likelihood that a client needing location validation reaches servers that are not performing validation due to configuration or load conditions, a risk that has existed since RFC 5582.

dns

interoperability-note §4

A LoST client implemented prior to the 'LoST-Validation' tag will use the 'LoST' tag to resolve an AUS. If the contacted mapping server refuses validation, the client retries later, or the server may return a redirect with a different AUS pointing to a designated validation server.

dns

interoperability-note §3

Because some servers may be configured to provide both mapping and validation, a server identified by the 'LoST' tag might also perform validation; resolving both tags could yield the same URL. When URLs differ, they may point to the same or different physical servers.

dns

interoperability-note §3

In the absence of any NAPTR records containing the 'LoST-Validation' service tag, the 'LoST' service tag is used. Clients may also fall back to 'LoST' if 'LoST-Validation' fails to resolve to a usable LoST server.

dns

normative-requirement §5 SHOULD

When performing NAPTR resolution for LoST validation discovery, DNS security (DNSSEC, per RFC 4033) SHOULD be used to mitigate the risk of DNS-based attacks.

dns, security

protocol-element §3

The 'LoST-Validation' service tag is used in NAPTR DNS records to identify LoST servers designated for location validation. Clients perform the same U-NAPTR/DDDS discovery procedure as described in RFC 5222, but substituting 'LoST-Validation' for 'LoST' as the service tag; both HTTP and HTTPS URL schemes are used.

dns

registry §6.1

This document registers the 'LoST-Validation' application service tag in the IANA 'S-NAPTR Application Service Tags' registry created by RFC 3958. It serves as a counterpart to the 'LoST' tag added by RFC 5222, enabling explicit discovery of servers designated for location validation.

registry, dns

security-consideration §5

Security considerations from RFC 3958, RFC 4848, and RFC 5222 all apply. No additional security concerns are introduced by adding the new tag. Separation of services via distinct tags allows allocation of different resource levels (server capacity, attack mitigation, bandwidth) to mapping vs. validation services.

security, dns

security-consideration §5

While valid reasons exist to proceed with a LoST mapping query despite DNSSEC failures during emergency call routing, these concerns generally do not apply to a LoST validation query made in advance; therefore DNSSEC protection is more uniformly applicable to the validation path.

security, dns