rfc-8893

Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Origin Validation for BGP Export

R. Bush, R. Volk, J. Heitz
date2020-09 streamIETF areaops wgsidrops statusPROPOSED STANDARD pages5 canonicalhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8893 doi10.17487/RFC8893
A BGP speaker may perform Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) origin validation not only on routes received from BGP neighbors and routes that are redistributed from other routing protocols, but also on routes it sends to BGP neighbors. For egress policy, it is important that the classification use the 'effective origin AS' of the processed route, which may specifically be altered by the commonly available knobs, such as removing private ASes, confederation handling, and other modifications of the origin AS. This document updates RFC 6811.

updates

Extracted elements (11)

design-rationale §3

Egress policy handling can provide more robust protection for outbound eBGP than relying solely on ingress (iBGP, eBGP, connected, static, etc.) redistribution being configured and working correctly — i.e., better support for the robustness principle.

bgp, routing, security

design-rationale §1

This document does not change the protocol or semantics of RFC 6811; it clarifies that implementations must use the effective origin AS (post-egress-policy) rather than the RIB origin AS when performing egress RPKI origin validation.

bgp, routing, security

interoperability-note §3

The effective origin AS used for egress validation may differ from the route's origin AS in the RIB due to commonly applied knobs such as removal of private ASes, AS path manipulation, confederation handling (RFC 5065), and AS migration (RFC 7705).

bgp, routing

normative-requirement §1 MUST

A validating BGP speaker MUST apply Route Origin Validation policy semantics after applying any egress configuration and policy, using the effective origin AS of the UPDATE to be sent.

bgp, security, routing

normative-requirement §4 SHOULD

An implementation SHOULD be able to list announcements that were not sent to a peer (e.g., because they were marked Invalid), as long as the router still has them in memory.

bgp, routing

normative-requirement §1 MUST

Any AS_PATH modifications resulting in an effective origin AS change MUST be taken into account when performing egress origin validation.

bgp, routing, security

normative-requirement §3 MUST

BGP implementations supporting RPKI-based origin validation MUST provide the same policy configuration primitives for validation-state-based decisions in ingress, redistribution, and egress policies.

bgp, routing, security

normative-requirement §4 SHOULD

It SHOULD be possible to specify a selective origin validation policy to be applied after any existing non-validating outbound policies, to handle complex configurations where the effective origin AS may not be easily determined early.

bgp, routing

normative-requirement §3 MUST

When applied to egress policy, validation state MUST be determined using the effective origin AS of the route as it will (or would) be announced to the peer, not the origin AS stored in the RIB.

bgp, routing, security

protocol-element §1

The 'effective origin AS' is the Route Origin Autonomous System Number of the UPDATE to be sent to neighboring BGP speakers, as determined by configuration and outbound policy — which may differ from the origin AS in the RIB due to private AS removal, confederation handling, AS migration, or other AS_PATH modifications.

bgp, routing, security

security-consideration §5

This document does not create security considerations beyond those of RFC 6811 and RFC 8481. By facilitating more correct validation using the effective origin AS at egress, it attempts to improve BGP reliability.

bgp, security, routing