rfc-7196

Making Route Flap Damping Usable

C. Pelsser, R. Bush, K. Patel, P. Mohapatra, O. Maennel
date2014-05 streamIETF areartg wgidr statusPROPOSED STANDARD pages8 canonicalhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7196 doi10.17487/RFC7196 errataview
Route Flap Damping (RFD) was first proposed to reduce BGP churn in routers. Unfortunately, RFD was found to severely penalize sites for being well connected because topological richness amplifies the number of update messages exchanged. Many operators have turned RFD off. Based on experimental measurement, this document recommends adjusting a few RFD algorithmic constants and limits in order to reduce the high risks with RFD. The result is damping a non-trivial amount of long-term churn without penalizing well-behaved prefixes' normal convergence process.

Extracted elements (13)

design-rationale §4

A suppress threshold of 6,000 reduces the BGP update rate by 19% compared to no RFD, while damping 90% fewer prefixes than the default 2,000 threshold. This demonstrates that a higher threshold effectively targets chronic flappers while sparing normally converging prefixes.

bgp, routing, measurement

design-rationale §1

Measurements showed only 3% of prefixes were responsible for 36% of BGP messages at a router with real feeds, implying that only very frequently flapping prefixes should be damped. The recommended values target this small fraction without penalizing normal convergence.

bgp, routing, measurement

design-rationale §1

RFD was found to severely penalize well-connected sites because topological richness amplifies the number of BGP update messages exchanged, causing many operators to disable RFD entirely. This document recommends parameter adjustments rather than algorithmic overhaul to reduce risk with minimal change.

bgp, routing

design-rationale §1

The goal is minimal change to ameliorate the danger of current RFD implementations, explicitly not a panacea or deep approach to flap reduction. This conservative scope is chosen to reduce implementation risk and preserve backward compatibility with existing operational configurations.

bgp, routing

interoperability-note §3

Cisco defaults use a Suppress Threshold of 2,000 and Re-Advertisement penalty of 0, while Juniper defaults use 3,000 and 1,000 respectively. There is currently no consensus on a single set of default RFD parameter values across implementations.

bgp, routing

normative-requirement §6 SHOULD

Conservative operators SHOULD configure the Suppress Threshold to no less than 12,000, resulting in only 0.22% of prefixes being damped with an average hourly update reduction of 11%.

bgp, routing

normative-requirement §6 SHOULD NOT

Existing BGP implementations SHOULD NOT change their default RFD parameter values in order not to break existing operational configurations.

bgp, routing

normative-requirement §6 MAY

Implementations MAY provide a test mode where operators can observe the results of a particular RFD configuration without actually damping any prefixes, enabling fine-tuning without loss of reachability.

bgp, routing

normative-requirement §6 SHOULD

Operators wanting damping that is less destructive but still somewhat aggressive SHOULD configure the Suppress Threshold to no less than 6,000, which reduces damped prefixes by 90% compared to the default 2,000 threshold.

bgp, routing

normative-requirement §6 MUST

The internal constant for the maximum penalty value MUST be raised to at least 50,000 to prevent the computed penalty from being artificially capped at values too low for effective discrimination between chronic flappers and normal convergence.

bgp, routing

protocol-element §3

RFD parameters common to all implementations include: Withdrawal penalty (1,000), Re-Advertisement penalty (0 or 1,000), Attribute Change penalty (500), Suppress Threshold (2,000–3,000), Half-Life (15 min), Reuse Threshold (750), and Max Suppress Time (60 min). Some are operator-tunable; others are fixed.

bgp, routing

protocol-element §5

The 'computed maximum penalty' is an upper bound imposed by the RFD parameters and the implementation's sampling rate. Separately, implementations have an internal 'maximum penalty' constant that the current computed penalty may not exceed.

bgp, routing

security-consideration §7

An attacker can generate false flapping to cause a victim's prefix(es) to be damped. The more conservative parameter values recommended by this document slightly mitigate false-flap attacks compared to the aggressive defaults, and should not increase risk.

bgp, routing, security