rfc-7173

Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) Transport Using Pseudowires

L. Yong, D. Eastlake 3rd, S. Aldrin, J. Hudson
date2014-05 streamIETF areartg wgtrill statusPROPOSED STANDARD pages11 canonicalhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7173 doi10.17487/RFC7173
This document specifies how to interconnect a pair of Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) switch ports using pseudowires under existing TRILL and Pseudowire Emulation End-to-End (PWE3) standards.

Extracted elements (15)

design-rationale §2.1

If a pseudowire supports fragmentation and reassembly, there is no reason to perform TRILL MTU testing on it, and the pseudowire will not constrain the TRILL campus-wide MTU size (Sz). This is because F&R is rarely deployed in practice.

mpls, routing

design-rationale §A

PPP pseudowire encoding was chosen over Ethernet pseudowires or a new TRILL-specific pseudowire type. Ethernet pseudowires would add 12-16 bytes of overhead per packet. A new pseudowire type was rejected because any efficiency gain over PPP pseudowires would be too small to justify the complexity, and PPP pseudowire encoding allows existing TRILL PPP and PPP pseudowire dissectors to automatically decode TRILL traffic.

mpls, routing

interoperability-note §2.1

An intervening MPLS label switched router or similar packet switched network device has no awareness of TRILL and will not change the TRILL Header hop count, preserving end-to-end TRILL semantics across the pseudowire tunnel.

mpls, routing

interoperability-note §2

This application requires no additions to existing pseudowire standards. Either a signaling protocol (RFC 4447) or manual configuration can be used to set up the label switched path tunnel between two TRILL switch ports.

mpls, routing

normative-requirement §2.1 MUST

If the pseudowire does not support fragmentation (the common case), the available TRILL IS-IS packet payload size over the pseudowire (accounting for MPLS encapsulation with a control word) MUST be used in determining the TRILL campus-wide MTU size (Sz).

mpls, routing

normative-requirement §2.1 SHOULD

The sending pseudowire TRILL switch port SHOULD map the inner priority of TRILL Data packets to the Traffic Class field of the pseudowire label to minimize the probability that higher priority packets will be discarded due to lower priority packet congestion.

mpls, qos, routing

normative-requirement §2.1 SHOULD

TRILL IS-IS Hello and MTU PDUs (critical for adjacency) SHOULD be sent with the MPLS Traffic Class calling for maximum priority handling. Other IS-IS PDUs SHOULD use the highest priority below maximum, and TRILL Data packets SHOULD use lower Traffic Classes than IS-IS PDUs.

mpls, qos, routing

normative-requirement §2.2 MUST

When pseudowire interconnection of two TRILL switch ports is signaled, the initiating TRILL switch port MUST attempt the connection setup with pseudowire type PPP (0x0007).

mpls, routing

protocol-element §2.2

TRILL is transported over pseudowires using PPP encapsulation (PW type 0x0007) per RFC 4618. After the pseudowire is established and TRILL use is negotiated within PPP, the ports appear directly connected with a PPP link, following RFC 6361 behavior.

mpls, routing

protocol-element §2

TRILL switch ports interconnected via pseudowire act as native service processing (NSP) elements and as label switched or IP routers. The pseudowire provides transparent transport so the two ports appear directly interconnected, with TRILL adjacency automatically discovered via TRILL IS-IS control messages.

mpls, routing

security-consideration §3

For applications involving sensitive data, end-to-end security between end stations SHOULD always be considered in addition to link security, to protect the entire path to, through, and from the TRILL campus (security in depth).

security, routing

security-consideration §3 RECOMMENDED

It is NOT RECOMMENDED to use PPP security for TRILL transport over pseudowires because: the PPP layer is vestigial (primarily used for code point identification), and existing PPP security standards are questionable by current security criteria. Instead, link security SHOULD be provided at the MPLS, IP, or lower link layers supporting the pseudowires.

security, mpls, routing

security-consideration §3

TRILL-level security mechanisms (e.g., authentication with TRILL IS-IS PDUs) are not affected by the use of pseudowire links. Layered security is possible via PPP security, pseudowire security, MPLS/IP security, or the underlying link technology's security.

security, routing

wire-format §2.2

A TRILL Data packet over a PPP pseudowire in MPLS consists of: Server MPLS Tunnel Label(s) (n*4 octets), PW Label (4 octets), Control Word (4 octets), PPP Header 0x005d (2 octets), TRILL Header (6 octets), Destination MAC (6 octets), Source MAC (6 octets), Data Label (4 or 8 octets), and variable Payload Body.

mpls, routing

wire-format §2.2

A TRILL IS-IS packet over a PPP pseudowire in MPLS consists of: Server MPLS Tunnel Label(s) (n*4 octets), PW Label (4 octets), Control Word (4 octets), PPP Header 0x405d (2 octets), Common IS-IS Header (8 octets), IS-IS PDU Type Specific Header (variable), and IS-IS TLVs (variable).

mpls, routing