rfc-6784

Kerberos Options for DHCPv6

S. Sakane, M. Ishiyama
date2012-11 streamIETF areasec wgkrb-wg statusPROPOSED STANDARD pages12 canonicalhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6784 doi10.17487/RFC6784
This document defines four new options for the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6). These options are used to carry configuration information for Kerberos. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

Extracted elements (20)

design-rationale §1

Industrial and similar systems often do not use DNS (they have their own namespaces and name resolution, including preconfigured device tables, and do not use FQDNs), but most do use DHCP. Adding a DNS server to such environments decreases reliability and increases management cost, motivating a DHCP-based mechanism for KDC discovery.

security, dns

design-rationale §1

This option does not replace or modify existing methods (e.g., DNS SRV) for obtaining Kerberos configuration information; it is an additional mechanism for environments where DNS is unavailable or undesirable.

security, dns

interoperability-note §4.1

When a client implements both the DNS-based KDC discovery method (RFC 4120 Section 7.2.3.2) and the DHCPv6 method defined here, the choice of method is determined by local policy as configured by the realm administrator. When no policy is set and both are available, DNS is preferred.

security, dns

normative-requirement §3 MUST NOT

All Kerberos options except the Kerberos KDC Option MUST NOT appear more than once in a DHCPv6 message.

security

normative-requirement §6 SHOULD

Manual configuration of Kerberos information on the client SHOULD be preferred over configuration via the DHCPv6 server.

security

normative-requirement §3.2 MUST

The encoding of realm-name fields in the Realm Name, Default Realm Name, and KDC Options MUST conform to the definition of 'Realm' in Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4120.

security

normative-requirement §3.1 MUST

The encoding of the principal-name field in the Kerberos Principal Name Option MUST conform to the definition of 'PrincipalName' in Section 5.2.2 of RFC 4120.

security

normative-requirement §6 SHOULD

To minimize potential vulnerabilities from modified DHCPv6 responses, a client SHOULD use DHCPv6 authentication as defined in Section 21 of RFC 3315.

security

normative-requirement §4 MUST

When a server replies with more than one KDC option, the client's use of the Priority and Weight fields MUST follow the specification for DNS SRV [RFC 2782].

security, dns

normative-requirement §4.1 SHOULD

When both DNS and DHCPv6 methods are available and no criteria have been specified, Kerberos information from DNS SHOULD be preferred over DHCPv6.

security, dns

protocol-element §3.3

Kerberos Default Realm Name Option (OPTION_KRB_DEFAULT_REALM_NAME = 77) is sent by a DHCPv6 server to specify the default Kerberos realm to both clients and application servers. Its format is identical to the Realm Name Option.

security

protocol-element §3

RFC 6784 defines four new DHCPv6 options for Kerberos configuration: Kerberos Principal Name Option (75), Kerberos Realm Name Option (76), Kerberos Default Realm Name Option (77), and Kerberos KDC Option (78). These allow DHCPv6 to distribute Kerberos realm names and KDC addresses without requiring DNS.

registry, dns, security

protocol-element §3.4

Transport Type field in the KDC Option is 8 bits and indicates the transport protocol for Kerberos: 0 = Reserved, 1 = UDP, 2 = TCP, 3 = TLS, 4–254 = Unassigned, 255 = Reserved.

security, tls

registry §5

IANA assigned four option codes from the DHCPv6 Option Codes registry: 75 (OPTION_KRB_PRINCIPAL_NAME), 76 (OPTION_KRB_REALM_NAME), 77 (OPTION_KRB_DEFAULT_REALM_NAME), and 78 (OPTION_KRB_KDC).

registry, security

registry §5

IANA created the Kerberos Message Transport Types sub-registry under the Kerberos Parameters registry with initial values: 0 = Reserved, 1 = UDP, 2 = TCP, 3 = TLS, 4–254 = Unassigned, 255 = Reserved. Future assignments require IETF Review per BCP 26.

registry, security, tls

security-consideration §6

A shared, unconfigured workstation that lacks a host key cannot validate the Ticket-Granting Ticket issued by the KDC. A modified DHCPv6 response pointing to a malicious KDC would go undetected by such a workstation, potentially allowing unauthorized access.

security

security-consideration §6

DHCPv6 messages can be modified in transit; an adversary may redirect a client to a malicious KDC (a DoS attack). However, a malicious KDC cannot complete the exchange because it does not know the shared key, and the client can detect the mismatch using the shared key.

security

wire-format §3.4

Kerberos KDC Option (OPTION_KRB_KDC = 78): 16-bit option-code, 16-bit option-len (23 + realm-name length), 16-bit Priority, 16-bit Weight, 8-bit Transport Type, 16-bit Port Number, 128-bit KDC IPv6 address, and variable-length realm-name.

security, ip

wire-format §3.1

Kerberos Principal Name Option (OPTION_KRB_PRINCIPAL_NAME = 75): 16-bit option-code, 16-bit option-len, followed by a variable-length principal-name field encoded as PrincipalName per RFC 4120 Section 5.2.2.

security

wire-format §3.2

Kerberos Realm Name Option (OPTION_KRB_REALM_NAME = 76): 16-bit option-code, 16-bit option-len (length of realm-name in octets), and variable-length realm-name encoded as Realm per RFC 4120 Section 5.2.2.

security