rfc-5756

Updates for RSAES-OAEP and RSASSA-PSS Algorithm Parameters

S. Turner, D. Brown, K. Yiu, R. Housley, T. Polk
date2010-01 streamIETF areasec wgpkix statusPROPOSED STANDARD pages6 canonicalhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756 doi10.17487/RFC5756 errataview
This document updates RFC 4055. It updates the conventions for using the RSA Encryption Scheme - Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSAES-OAEP) key transport algorithm in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Specifically, it updates the conventions for algorithm parameters in an X.509 certificate's subjectPublicKeyInfo field. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

updates

Extracted elements (13)

design-rationale §3

RSAES-OAEP-params were prohibited from subjectPublicKeyInfo because (a) their absence does not affect interoperability and (b) it aligns with PKIX practice of not encoding usage limitations on public keys within subjectPublicKeyInfo. An implementer poll confirmed no objections.

pkix, crypto

design-rationale §1

The old text incorrectly referenced the 'publicKeyAlgorithms' field; this document corrects those references to the 'parameters' field within the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field, and rewords the relevant paragraphs for clarity.

pkix

design-rationale §1

The PKIX WG ECC design team recommended that Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) should not be constrained within a certificate; KDF constraints should instead be negotiated in the protocols that use the certificates.

pkix, crypto

interoperability-note §4

Similarly, the prohibition of parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo for RSAES-OAEP (Section 4.1 update) was confirmed by implementer poll to have no impact on existing implementations.

pkix, crypto

interoperability-note §3

The prohibition of RSAES-OAEP-params in subjectPublicKeyInfo does not affect interoperability; a poll of implementers confirmed the change does not affect current implementations.

pkix, crypto

normative-requirement §2 MUST

All certificates and CRLs signed by a CA that supports id-RSASSA-PSS MUST include RSASSA-PSS-params in the signatureAlgorithm parameters in the Certificate and CertList structures, respectively.

pkix, crypto, security

normative-requirement §3 MUST NOT

CAs that issue certificates with the id-RSAES-OAEP algorithm identifier MUST NOT include parameters in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field.

pkix, crypto

normative-requirement §4 MUST

When id-RSAES-OAEP is used in an AlgorithmIdentifier, the parameters MUST employ the RSAES-OAEP-params syntax, MUST be absent when used in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field, and MUST be present when used in the algorithm identifier associated with an encrypted value.

pkix, crypto

normative-requirement §2 MAY

When id-RSASSA-PSS appears in the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field of end-entity (EE) certificates, the parameters field MAY include the RSASSA-PSS-params structure.

pkix, crypto

normative-requirement §2 MUST

When the id-RSASSA-PSS object identifier appears in the TBSCertificate or TBSCertList signature algorithm field, the RSASSA-PSS-params structure MUST be included in the corresponding signature parameters field.

pkix, crypto, security

protocol-element §3

RSAES-OAEP-params are prohibited from the subjectPublicKeyInfo algorithm field entirely but are required in the AlgorithmIdentifier associated with any encrypted value.

pkix, crypto

protocol-element §2

RSASSA-PSS-params placement rules differ by certificate type and field: mandatory in signature/signatureAlgorithm fields, SHOULD for CA subjectPublicKeyInfo, and MAY for EE subjectPublicKeyInfo.

pkix, crypto

security-consideration §5

The security considerations from RFC 4055 apply. If RSAES-OAEP-params are negotiated, the negotiation mechanism must provide integrity for those parameters; for example, an S/MIME agent can advertise capabilities via the SMIMECapabilities attribute as a signed attribute or certificate extension.

security, pkix, crypto, email