rfc-4721

Mobile IPv4 Challenge/Response Extensions (Revised)

C. Perkins, P. Calhoun, J. Bharatia
date2007-01 streamIETF areaint wgmip4 statusPROPOSED STANDARD pages26 canonicalhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4721 doi10.17487/RFC4721 errataview
Mobile IP, as originally specified, defines an authentication extension (the Mobile-Foreign Authentication extension) by which a mobile node can authenticate itself to a foreign agent. Unfortunately, that extension does not provide the foreign agent any direct guarantee that the protocol is protected from replays and does not allow for the use of existing techniques (such as Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)) for authenticating portable computer devices. In this specification, we define extensions for the Mobile IP Agent Advertisements and the Registration Request that allow a foreign agent to use a challenge/response mechanism to authenticate the mobile node. Furthermore, this document updates RFC 3344 by including a new authentication extension called the Mobile-Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) Authentication extension. This new extension is provided so that a mobile node can supply credentials for authorization, using commonly available AAA infrastructure elements. This authorization-enabling extension MAY co-exist in the same Registration Request with authentication extensions defined for Mobile IP Registration by RFC 3344. This document obsoletes RFC 3012. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

obsoletes

updates

Extracted elements (27)

design-rationale §12

The Generalized Mobile IP Authentication Extension uses a subtype field to allow future authentication algorithms to be added without defining new extension types. Currently only subtype 1 (HMAC-MD5) is defined, but new subtypes can introduce different algorithms if HMAC-MD5 needs to be replaced.

mobility, security, crypto

design-rationale §1

The Mobile-AAA Authentication extension is designed so the foreign agent can interact with AAA infrastructure (e.g., RADIUS servers) to authenticate mobile nodes without requiring a direct security association between the foreign agent and the mobile node, enabling use of existing AAA deployments.

mobility, security, radius

interoperability-note §3.4

Since the Challenge extension type (24) falls in the range 128-255 for the Mobile-Foreign Challenge extension (132, skippable), a home agent that does not recognize the Challenge extension MUST still process the Registration Request per RFC 3344 and will send a Registration Reply without the Challenge extension.

mobility, interoperability-note

interoperability-note §6

The Mobile-AAA Authentication extension MAY co-exist in the same Registration Request with Mobile-Home and Mobile-Foreign Authentication extensions defined in RFC 3344, enabling gradual AAA infrastructure adoption without breaking existing authentication mechanisms.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.5 MUST

After an error, if the mobile node attempts to register again, it MUST use a new Challenge value obtained either from an Agent Advertisement or from a Challenge extension in the error Registration Reply.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.2 MUST

Any Registration Request containing a Challenge extension without either a Mobile-Foreign or Mobile-AAA Authentication extension MUST be silently discarded by the foreign agent.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §6 MUST

Each mobile node MUST support the ability to produce the Mobile-AAA authenticator using HMAC-MD5 computed over the preceding Mobile IP data concatenated with the Type, Subtype, Length, and SPI fields.

mobility, security, crypto

normative-requirement §2.1 MUST NOT

If a solicited Agent Advertisement is multicast, the foreign agent MUST NOT generate a new Challenge value; it must re-use the most recent of the CHALLENGE_WINDOW advertised Challenge values.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.1 MUST

If both Mobile-Foreign Authentication and Mobile-AAA Authentication extensions are present, the Mobile-Foreign Challenge extension MUST precede the Mobile-AAA Authentication extension, and the Mobile-AAA Authentication extension MUST precede the Mobile-Foreign Authentication extension.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.4 MUST

If the home agent receives a Registration Request with the Mobile-Foreign Challenge extension and recognizes it, the home agent MUST include the Challenge extension in the Registration Reply, placed after the Mobile-Home authentication extension.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.2 MUST NOT

If the Mobile-AAA Authentication extension is present in the Registration Request, the foreign agent MUST NOT remove the Mobile-AAA Authentication extension and the Mobile-Foreign Challenge extension from the Registration Request before forwarding to the home agent.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.1 MUST

If the mobile node has no security association with the foreign agent, it MUST include the Mobile-AAA Authentication extension when it includes the Mobile-Foreign Challenge extension, and SHOULD include the NAI extension to enable the foreign agent to use available verification infrastructure.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.2 MUST

If the Registration Request does not include a Challenge extension when one is required, the foreign agent MUST send a Registration Reply with Code field set to missing_challenge (105).

mobility, security

normative-requirement §4 MUST NOT

In any new Registration Request, a mobile node MUST NOT use any Challenge Value that was advertised before the Challenge Value used in the mobile node's last successful Registration Request.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.2 MUST NOT

The foreign agent MUST NOT accept any Challenge in the Registration Request unless it was offered in the last Registration Reply, unicast Agent Advertisement sent to the mobile node, or advertised as one of the last CHALLENGE_WINDOW Challenge values in preceding Agent Advertisements.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.3 SHOULD

The foreign agent SHOULD include a new Mobile-Foreign Challenge extension in any Registration Reply (successful or not). If omitting it, the FA MUST still respond with an agent advertisement containing a previously unused challenge in response to subsequent agent solicitations.

mobility, security

normative-requirement §3.1 MUST

When the Agent Advertisement contains a Challenge extension and the mobile node has no security association with the foreign agent, the mobile node MUST include the Challenge value in a Mobile-Foreign Challenge extension to the Registration Request.

mobility, security

protocol-element §8

CHAP_SPI (value 2) is a reserved SPI number used to indicate CHAP-style authentication (MD5-based) compatible with RADIUS AAA servers. The authenticator is computed using the high-order challenge octet, key, MD5 of preceding data, and least-order 237 octets of challenge.

mobility, security, radius, crypto

protocol-element §2

The Agent Advertisement Challenge Extension (Type 24) is inserted by the foreign agent into Agent Advertisements to communicate a previously unused challenge value for mobile node authentication. The Challenge field SHOULD be at least 32 bits and the Length SHOULD be at least 4 octets.

mobility, security

protocol-element §6

The Mobile-AAA Authentication extension is subtype 1 of the Generalized Mobile IP Authentication Extension. It uses HMAC-MD5 over preceding Mobile IP data and extension header fields as the default authenticator computation algorithm.

mobility, security, crypto, diameter

registry §11

IANA assignments from RFC 3012 are carried over: Generalized Mobile IP Authentication Extension Type 36, MN-FA Challenge Extension Type 132, error code values (unknown_challenge=104, missing_challenge=105, stale_challenge=106, fa_bad_aaa_auth=108, ha_wrong_challenge=109, ha_bad_aaa_auth=144), and CHAP_SPI=2 in the reserved SPI range 0-255.

registry, mobility, security

security-consideration §12

If the foreign agent uses a Challenge value fewer than 4 octets, it SHOULD include the Identification field value in its records to detect replays, since the short challenge alone may not provide sufficient uniqueness assurance.

security, mobility

security-consideration §12

The use of MD5 in the CHAP_SPI/RADIUS-compatible authenticator computation (Section 8) is less secure than HMAC-MD5 and MUST be avoided whenever possible. HMAC-MD5 is the preferred algorithm for the Mobile-AAA Authentication extension.

security, crypto, mobility

security-consideration §12

To prevent denial-of-service attacks where an active attacker sends bogus Registration Requests or Agent Solicitations to exhaust challenges, the foreign agent MUST NOT invalidate previously unused challenges when responding to unauthenticated requests and MUST NOT allocate new storage in response to such messages.

security, mobility

wire-format §2

The Challenge Extension has a Type field (1 octet, value 24), a Length field (1 octet, indicating Challenge length in octets, SHOULD be at least 4), and a variable-length Challenge field (SHOULD be at least 32 bits).

mobility, security

wire-format §5

The Generalized Mobile IP Authentication Extension (Type 36, not skippable) has a Type (1 octet), Subtype (1 octet), Length (2 octets, MUST be at least 20), SPI (4 octets), and variable-length Authenticator field.

mobility, security, crypto

wire-format §4

The Mobile-Foreign Challenge Extension (Type 132, skippable) carries a Type field (1 octet), Length field (1 octet), and Challenge field copied verbatim from the received Challenge extension in the Agent Advertisement.

mobility, security