rfc-4415

IANA Registration for Enumservice Voice

R. Brandner, L. Conroy, R. Stastny
date2006-02 streamIETF arearai wgenum statusPROPOSED STANDARD pages8 canonicalhttps://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4415 doi10.17487/RFC4415
This document registers the Enumservice "voice" (which has a defined subtype "tel"), as per the IANA registration process defined in the ENUM specification RFC 3761. This service indicates that the contact held in the generated Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) can be used to initiate an interactive voice (audio) call. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

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Extracted elements (15)

design-rationale §3

The PSTN/PLMN connection implied by a voice:tel NAPTR may be indirect: an end-user device may use SIP or H.323 to a remote gateway that terminates to the PSTN, converting 'tel:' URIs to a protocol-native form. This acknowledges that not all callers have direct PSTN access.

voip, sip, realtime

design-rationale §1

The subtype 'tel' is defined separately from the 'voice' type because the subsystem required to initiate the call (a dialer) is distinct from the teleservice itself. This mirrors the ENUM design principle that subtypes identify the protocol/subsystem used to reach the endpoint.

voip, dns

interoperability-note §1

An Enumservice indication operates only within the context of the 'E2U' DDDS application (ENUM). Although other DDDS applications exist (e.g., RFC 3404, RFC 3405), voice:tel NAPTRs are not intended for use in those contexts.

dns, voip

normative-requirement §3 SHOULD NOT

A 'local phone number' form SHOULD NOT be used in a voice:tel NAPTR unless the zone controller is certain it can be unambiguously distinguished by all clients that can access the record and that calls can be routed to the destination from their access points.

voip, dns

normative-requirement §5 SHOULD

Before a voice call is placed via the PSTN or PLMN, the originating user SHOULD be shown the destination number so they can make an informed decision about whether to proceed.

voip, security

normative-requirement §5 MUST

Due to the implications of publishing data on a globally accessible database, data subjects MUST give their explicit informed consent before their data is published in ENUM.

privacy, dns, security

normative-requirement §3 SHOULD

The 'tel:' URI value carried in a voice:tel NAPTR SHOULD use the fully qualified 'global phone number' form as defined in RFC 3966.

voip, dns, sip

privacy-consideration §5

Unlike a telephone directory entry made by explicit submission, ENUM publication makes telephone numbers machine-harvestable at scale without the data subject's knowledge. The document warns that E.164 numbers cannot easily be made 'sacrificial' like throwaway email addresses.

privacy, dns

protocol-element §1

An Enumservice has a type and an optional subtype; the subtype is typically associated with the URI scheme used to initiate the session. Both type and subtype must be supported for the enclosing NAPTR to be usable by a correspondent.

dns, voip, sip

protocol-element §3

The voice:tel Enumservice indicates that the contact in the generated URI can be used to initiate interactive voice (audio) communication involving bidirectional media streams. The subtype 'tel' implies use of the 'tel:' URI scheme and a dialer subsystem connecting to PSTN or PLMN.

sip, voip, dns, realtime

registry §6

IANA registers the Enumservice type 'voice' with subtype 'tel' under the framework defined in RFC 3761. The associated URI scheme is 'tel:' and the intended usage is COMMON.

registry, dns, sip, voip

security-consideration §5

All general security considerations from RFC 3761 (ENUM) apply, as well as the DNS-specific threat analysis in RFC 3833, which covers cache poisoning, denial of service, and other DNS-layer attacks.

security, dns

security-consideration §5

Calls placed to PSTN/PLMN numbers via voice:tel may incur charges, including premium-rate tariffs considerably higher than standard calls. End users must be asked to confirm call placement and shown the destination number to allow informed consent.

security, voip

security-consideration §5

ENUM data is publicly visible to anyone anonymously via DNS. This exposes published telephone numbers to automated harvesting by third parties, enabling unsolicited voice calls, junk faxes, and junk SMS—analogous to spam targeting of email addresses scraped from mailing lists.

security, privacy, dns

security-consideration §5

Once published in ENUM, removal of an E.164 number from the zone does not remove copies harvested by third parties; any publication may effectively be permanent. Regulations in many regions require that data subjects can request removal and that consent be confirmed at regular intervals.

security, privacy, dns