Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Qualified Certificates Profile
obsoleted by
- rfc-3739 — Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile
Extracted elements (33)
Biometric information is stored as a cryptographic hash rather than raw biometric data. The extension MAY include a URI pointing to the actual data, but the hash serves authentication of biometric information. Biometric types are limited to those suitable for human verification (picture, handwritten-signature).
The profile defines a general syntax independent of local legal requirements, intentionally not defining the specific semantics of Qualified Certificates. Laws and corporate policies are expected to define semantics; the profile only specifies what information goes in the certificate, not what it means.
Two complementary mechanisms are defined for a CA to assert that a certificate is a Qualified Certificate: inclusion of an appropriate certificate policy OID in the certificatePolicies extension, and a statement in the QCStatements extension. These are designed to be complementary rather than mutually exclusive.
In case of discrepancies between the 1988 and 1993 ASN.1 modules in Appendix A, the 1988 module is normative. The 1993 module is informative only, in conformance with RFC 2459 practice.
Many client implementations presuppose the presence of the commonName attribute in the subject field and display it regardless of givenName, surname, or pseudonym values; implementors should account for this behavior when structuring subject fields.
Many X.500 implementations require the presence of countryName in the DIT. Where the subject name specifies a public X.500 directory entry, the countryName attribute SHOULD always be present.
Compliant implementations SHALL be able to interpret the following subject directory attributes: title, dateOfBirth, placeOfBirth, gender, countryOfCitizenship, and countryOfResidence.
Each QCStatement SHALL include an OID for the statement and MAY include statementInfo; if statementInfo is included, the OID SHALL define the syntax and SHOULD define the semantics.
For the predefined biometric types (picture, handwritten-signature), the hash SHALL only be calculated over the image data excluding any labels defining the image type.
If a SemanticsInformation value is present in a QCStatement, at least one of the fields semanticsIdentifier and nameRegistrationAuthorities MUST be present.
The biometricInfo extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
The certificate policies extension SHALL contain the identifier of at least one certificate policy reflecting the CA's practices and procedures.
The distinguished name in the subject field MUST be unique for each subject entity certified by the one CA as defined by the issuer name field, during the whole life time of the CA.
The issuer field SHALL identify the organization responsible for issuing the certificate. The name SHOULD be an officially registered name of the organization.
The key usage extension SHALL be present. If the nonRepudiation bit is asserted, it SHOULD NOT be combined with any other key usage bits.
The subject field SHALL include at least one of: commonName (Choice I), givenName (Choice II), or pseudonym (Choice III). Other attributes must not be necessary to distinguish the subject from others within the issuer domain.
The subjectDirectoryAttributes extension MUST NOT be marked critical.
The surname and givenName attributes SHALL, if present, contain the registered name of the subject in accordance with applicable law, and SHALL be used in the subject field if commonName is not present.
Use of the pseudonym attribute MUST NOT be combined with use of any of the attributes surname and/or givenName.
The BiometricData structure contains: typeOfBiometricData (CHOICE of PredefinedBiometricType integer or OID), hashAlgorithm (AlgorithmIdentifier), biometricDataHash (OCTET STRING), and an optional sourceDataUri (IA5String). PredefinedBiometricType values are picture(0) and handwritten-signature(1).
The issuer field SHALL use an appropriate subset of: domainComponent, countryName, stateOrProvinceName, organizationName, localityName, and serialNumber to identify the CA. Additional attributes MAY be present but SHOULD NOT be necessary for identification.
The QCStatement structure is a SEQUENCE containing a statementId (OID) and an optional statementInfo whose syntax is defined by the statementId OID. Multiple QCStatement entries are grouped in a QCStatements SEQUENCE OF.
The Qualified Certificate subject field supports the following attributes: countryName, commonName, surname, givenName, pseudonym, serialNumber, organizationName, organizationalUnitName, stateOrProvinceName, localityName, and postalAddress.
The SemanticsInformation structure (identified by id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1) contains an optional semanticsIdentifier OID defining attribute semantics and an optional nameRegistrationAuthorities SEQUENCE OF GeneralName; at least one must be present.
This document registers OIDs under the PKIX arc: id-pe-biometricInfo (id-pe 2) and id-pe-qcStatements (id-pe 3) as private certificate extensions; id-pda (id-pkix 9) as the arc for personal data attributes (dateOfBirth, placeOfBirth, gender, countryOfCitizenship, countryOfResidence); id-qcs (id-pkix 11) as the arc for QC statements including id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1 (id-qcs 1).
CAs should not issue CA certificates with policy mapping extensions indicating acceptance of another CA's policy unless conditions for Qualified Certificate issuance (sole control of private key, verified public key) are met.
Combining the nonRepudiation bit in the keyUsage extension with other keyUsage bits may have security implications; this specification recommends against such practices. Both private key holder and relying party should ensure the key is used only with the consent of the legitimate holder.
Comparing two Qualified Certificates to determine if they represent the same physical entity is dependent on name semantics, which may differ between issuers. Comparing names without knowledge of semantics in specific certificates may produce misleading results.
The associated private key for a Qualified Certificate must be unique to the subject and maintained under the subject's sole control. A CA should not issue a Qualified Certificate if the means to use the private key is not protected against unintended usage, implying the CA must have knowledge about the subject's cryptographic module.
BiometricData is encoded as an ASN.1 SEQUENCE with fields typeOfBiometricData (CHOICE), hashAlgorithm (AlgorithmIdentifier SEQUENCE), biometricDataHash (OCTET STRING), and sourceDataUri (IA5String OPTIONAL). BiometricSyntax is a SEQUENCE OF BiometricData.
DateOfBirth is encoded as GeneralizedTime; PlaceOfBirth as DirectoryString; serialNumber as PrintableString SIZE(1..64); PostalAddress as SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString; Pseudonym as DirectoryString.
QCStatement is encoded as ASN.1 SEQUENCE { statementId OBJECT IDENTIFIER, statementInfo ANY DEFINED BY statementId OPTIONAL }. The 1988 module uses ANY DEFINED BY; the 1993 module uses information object class constraints.
The gender attribute is encoded as PrintableString SIZE(1) constrained to 'M', 'F', 'm', or 'f'. CountryOfCitizenship and CountryOfResidence are encoded as PrintableString SIZE(2) constrained to ISO 3166 country codes.