Transitive Attestation for Sovereign Workloads: A WIMSE Profile

This document defines a *WIMSE Profile* for Transitive Attestation within the Workload Identity in Multi-Service Environments (WIMSE) framework. It addresses the critical problem of *Identity Portability*, where software credentials (e.g., bearer tokens or keys) can be misappropriated and used from unauthorized environments—a risk amplified by the emergence of autonomous *AI Agents* that may move across jurisdictions or be hijacked via *prompt injection attacks*. By providing a standardized *Identity Conveyance* mechanism, this profile cryptographically binds software workloads to their local execution environment ("Proof of Residency") through a transitive chain of trust. This chain consumes *Evidence* from the underlying platform—supporting both *high-assurance* RATS-based profiles (e.g., [[!I-D.lkspa-wimse-verifiable-geo-fence]]) for residency verification and *standard* Workload Identity Agents for basic co-location proofs—to ensure that an identity is only valid when used from a verified, integral, or geographically compliant host. The integrity and hardware-rooted security of the Workload Identity Agent itself is considered out-of-scope for this document and is addressed in the *Verifiable Geofencing* profile [[!I-D.lkspa- wimse-verifiable-geo-fence]].