draft-drake-email-hardware-attestation
Hardware Attestation for Email Sender Verification
This document defines a mechanism for automated email senders (AI
agents, bots, and autonomous systems) to include hardware attestation
evidence in message headers, enabling receiving mail servers to
cryptographically verify that the sending system has access to a
genuine hardware security component -- such as a Trusted Platform
Module (TPM), a PIV smart card (e.g., YubiKey), a virtual TPM, or a
software-managed key -- from a known manufacturer or issuer. The
attestation proves hardware presence, not message composition locale.
The verification chain runs from the email header to a manufacturer's
root Certificate Authority (for hardware-backed attestation) or to an
issuer's verification key (for issuer-certified attestation).
Each automated sender is assigned a persistent agent identity,
expressed as a URN in the "aid" (Agent Identity) namespace
([RFC8141]), enabling federated issuance by multiple independent
identity providers and persistent reputation tracking across
protocols and platforms.
As a companion mechanism, this document defines a privacy-preserving
alternative using SD-JWT (Selective Disclosure JWT, [RFC9901]) where
the sender can prove specific claims about their hardware trust level
without revealing their hardware identity.
Together, these mechanisms provide both Sybil-resistant
authentication and a foundation for reputation building: each
identity requires a unique hardware security component, making large-
scale automated abuse economically infeasible regardless of advances
in artificial intelligence, while the persistent hardware-anchored
identity enables receiving systems to accumulate trust signals over
time. Software-only agents MAY participate at a lower trust tier,
building reputation from an initial baseline rather than from a
hardware-anchored starting point.
While this document specifies these mechanisms for email message
headers, the attestation formats defined herein -- both the CMS
attestation bundle and the SD-JWT trust proof -- are self-contained,
transport-independent data structures applicable to HTTP headers,
agent-to-agent messaging, payment authorisation, and other Internet
protocols.